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McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020)
Allison Barnwell
The United States Supreme Court ruled that large areas of
Oklahoma, including much of the City of Tulsa, are reservation land. The
case arose from an Oklahoma state court’s conviction of Jimcy McGirt on
several criminal offenses. Mr. McGirt argued the State of Oklahoma
lacked jurisdiction to prosecute because he was an enrolled member of the
Seminole Nation of Oklahoma and committed his crimes on the Creek
Reservation. Under the Major Crimes Act, only the federal government
has the power to try tribal members for crimes committed on reservation
lands. In a five to four decision, the Court held that Congress never
disestablished the Creek Reservation, and therefore, Oklahoma had no
jurisdiction over Mr. McGirt.
I. INTRODUCTION
McGirt v. Oklahoma1 is Mr. McGirt’s pro se post-conviction
appeal from his Oklahoma state court conviction for several serious sexual
crimes.2 Mr. McGirt is an enrolled member of the Seminole Nation of
Oklahoma,3 and on appeal, Mr. McGirt argued the State of Oklahoma had
no right to prosecute the crimes he committed in Northeastern Oklahoma
because the area where he committed the crimes was reserved to the
Muscogee Creek Tribe (“the Tribe”).4 Under the Major Crimes Act
(“MCA”), states generally have no jurisdiction to prosecute tribal
members for crimes committed in “Indian country.”5
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1832, the Tribe entered into a treaty with the United States for
land in Oklahoma in exchange for the Tribe’s ceding of “all lands in the
East.”6 The United States government promised land to the Tribe for a
“permanent home to the whole Creek Nation.”7 Oklahoma courts,
1.
McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020).
2.
Id. at 2459.
3.
Id.
4.
Id.
5.
Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. §1153(a) (2018); Negonsott v. Samuels, 507
U.S. 99, 102–03 (1993)).
6.
Id. at 2460 (citing to Treaty with the Creeks, Arts. XIV, Mar. 24,
1832, 7 Stat. 366, 367 [hereinafter 1832 Treaty]). The Muscogee Creek people were
forced to cede “all their land, East of the Mississippi” in exchange for the treaty
promise that “the Creek country west of the Mississippi shall be solemnly guaranteed
to the Creek Indians.” 1832 Treaty, Arts. I, XIV, 7 Stat. 366, 368. The Creek people
left their ancestral homes in Georgia and Alabama in what is known as the Trail of
Tears to arrive in Northeastern Oklahoma. McGirt, at 6.
7.
Id. at 2459 (citing Treaty with the Creeks, preamble, Feb. 14, 1833,
7 Stat. 418 (1833 Treaty)).
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however, refused to recognize parts of the land guaranteed to the Tribe by
treaty, including much of the city of Tulsa, Oklahoma. Mr. McGirt
committed crimes on land within the historic boundaries of the Creek
Reservation, but land not recognized by Oklahoma courts as Indian
Territory.8
Oklahoma asserted jurisdiction over Mr. McGirt’s crimes, and he
was convicted in an Oklahoma state court of three sexual offenses.9 Mr.
McGirt’s post-conviction petition came nearly a month after the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit issued a decision in Murphy
v. Royal.10 There, the court held large swaths of land in Northeastern
Oklahoma, including some of the same land at issue in McGirt, remained
a reservation for the Tribe despite Oklahoma’s assertion that the Creek
Reservation had been disestablished.11 Mr. McGirt filed his first of several
post-conviction petitions in Oklahoma, and he presented arguments based
on the Tenth Circuit’s holding.12 When the Oklahoma state courts
dismissed Mr. McGirt’s appeals, Mr. McGirt appealed his case to the
United States Supreme Court.13
III. ANALYSIS
The Court analyzed three arguments raised on review: (1) whether
the Creek Reservation was disestablished, (2) whether Congress had
established a reservation for the Creek Nation, and (3) whether the MCA
applied to Northeastern Oklahoma.14
A. Despite Broken Promises to the Tribe, Congress has not
Disestablished the Creek Reservation
The Court began its analysis by noting the multiple treaties
establishing the Creek Reservation in Northeastern Oklahoma and
explaining the law for disestablishing a reservation.15 Congress alone
holds the power to breach its own promises or treaties, and therefore, only
an Act of Congress may disestablish a reservation.16 Further, Congress
must explicitly express its intent to disestablish in legislation as it has done
in the past.17 The Court then dismissed three arguments advanced by
8.
Id. at 2460.
9.
Id. at 2459.
10.
Id. at 2460; Murphy v. Royal, 875 F.3d 896 (10th Cir. 2017), rev’d
sub nom. Sharp v. Murphy 589 U.S. ___ (2019).
11.
Murphy, 875 F.3d at 907–09. The claims in Sharp were resolved by
the Court’s holding in McGirt. Sharp, 589 U.S. ___ (2019).
12.
McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2460.
13.
Id.
14.
Id. at 2459–82.
15.
Id. at 2460–62.
16.
Id. at 2462.
17.
Id. (citing Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 470; Hagen v. Utah, 510
U.S. 399, 412 (1994); Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 504, n. 22 (1973); Nebraska v.
Parker, 577 U.S. 481, ___, ___ (2016) (slip op., at 6)).
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Oklahoma attempting to prove that, despite the lack of express
congressional intent, the Creek Reservation was nonetheless
disestablished.
First, Oklahoma argued the “allotment era,” when Congress
pressured tribes to parcel their lands into smaller lots owned by
individuals, was Congress’s first step in disestablishing the Creek
Reservation.18 However, the Court explained that absent express
congressional intent “the Creek Reservation survived allotment,”19 and the
MCA contemplates private land ownership within reservation
boundaries.20 Congress may have intended allotment to be the first step in
ending reservations, but Congress never followed through to disestablish
the Creek Reservation. The Court stated that “Congress may have passed
allotment laws to create the conditions for disestablishment. But to equate
allotment with disestablishment would confuse the first step of a march
with arrival at its destination.”21
Second, Oklahoma argued Congress’ intrusions on the Tribe’s
self-governance during the allotment era was evidence of
disestablishment.22 Over time, Congress stripped away the authority and
autonomy of the Tribe, but the Court noted that the laws were only
necessary because the Tribe retained its status as a sovereign nation.23 By
1967, Congress reversed course and began to reestablish tribal
sovereignty.24 The Creek Nation has since ratified a new constitution,
established branches of government, and generally governs the Creek
Nation democratically.25 Congress may have taken the first step toward
disestablishment with the allotment era, but it did not dissolve the Tribe or
disestablish the Creek Reservation.26
Finally, Oklahoma argued for disestablishment by pointing to
historic practices and demographics in Northeastern Oklahoma.27
Oklahoma urged the Court to adopt a three-step rule to find
disestablishment by examining the facts of the laws passed by Congress,
contemporary events, and later events and demographics.28 The Court
rejected the proposed test and instead cited its responsibility to “follow the
original meaning of the law,”29 and clarified that the only appropriate time
18.
Id. at 2463.
19.
Id. at 2464.
20.
Id.
21.
Id. at 2465.
22.
Id.
23.
Id. at 2466 (“And, its own way, the congressional incursion on tribal
legislative processes only served to prove the power: Congress would have had no
need to subject tribal legislation to Presidential review if the Tribe lacked any authority
to legislate.”).
24.
Id. at 2467.
25.
Id.
26.
Id. at 2468.
27.
Id.
28.
Id.
29.
Id. (citing New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 586 U. S. _ (2019) (slip op., at
6)).
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for the Court to look to evidence outside the plain meaning of the statutory
language is when an ambiguous statutory phrase or term is in question.30
According to the Court, Oklahoma failed to raise any ambiguity in the
statutes in question.31
The Court then addressed the dissent’s reasoning. The Court
condemned the dissent’s use of extratextual evidence, and reaffirmed that
the Supreme Court has never found a reservation disestablished without
first finding a statute that required disestablishment.32 Writing for the
majority, Justice Gorsuch also rebuked the theory that history and
demographics could disestablish a reservation, and noted that the adoption
of a proposed test to disestablish a reservation without clear congressional
intent would usurp the legislature of its function and “treat Native
American claims of statutory right as less valuable than others.”33
Allowing a state to disestablish a reservation through ignoring the law,
fraudulently causing Indian landowners to lose titles to their land, and
predicting the end of a reservation would be “the rule of the strong, not the
rule of law.”34
B. Congress Established a Reservation for
the Creek Nation through Treaties
Oklahoma next argued that Congress had never actually
established a reservation for the Creek in the first place.35 Instead of being
a recognized reservation, Oklahoma proposed that the Tribe qualified as a
“dependent Indian community.”36 A “dependent Indian community”
status, Oklahoma argued, is more easily lost than a reservation.37
Oklahoma claimed reservation land must be “reserved from sale.”38 The
Creek Nation, unlike other tribes, received a land patent from the United
States under the Treaty of 1833, and Oklahoma contended the Tribe’s land
therefore did not qualify as a reservation because it was not “reserved from
sale.”39
The Court disagreed with Oklahoma’s argument, and held that
while no specific words are required to establish a reservation, the
language in the treaties in question has been repeatedly held to establish a
reservation.40 Further, land held in fee title is not incompatible with
reservation status.41

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2470.
Id.
Id. at 2474.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2475.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373, 390 (1902)).
Id.
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C. Eastern Oklahoma is Subject to the Major Crimes Act
Oklahoma next argued the MCA has never applied to the eastern
half of Oklahoma because the language of the Oklahoma Enabling Act
implies that the State has jurisdiction over all people and several statutes
discuss the assignment of cases in court in Indian Territory.42 Oklahoma
posited that it would be unthinkable for Congress to leave a jurisdictional
gap under the MCA, where the federal government could not prosecute
Indian-on-Indian crimes committed in Indian country, and therefore,
Congress must have intended for Oklahoma to assert jurisdiction upon
statehood.43 The Court rejected this argument, because when Oklahoma
gained statehood in 1907, the MCA applied.44 Oklahoma may have
continued to try Indians for crimes committed anywhere within Oklahoma,
but this practice deviated from the requirements of the MCA.45 The Court
noted jurisdictional gaps under the MCA are common and therefore the
gap in jurisdiction did not grant Oklahoma jurisdiction.46
D. Policy Arguments for Disestablishment are
not a Legal Basis to Ignore the Law
Finally, Oklahoma argued that the consequences of finding that
the Creek Reservation was intact were so transformative that the Court
should find for disestablishment.47 Specifically, Oklahoma pointed to the
possibility of other tribes seeking enforcement of treaty promises, and that
nearly half of Oklahoma residents could end up living within Indian
country.48
The Court was not convinced by Oklahoma’s policy arguments,
and refuted Oklahoma’s claim that finding for Mr. McGirt would have
such “transformative” effects as Oklahoma warned.49 First, the Court
noted that other tribes seeking vindication of treaty rights must
individually bring claims, because the question before the Court only
concerned the Creek Reservation.50 Second, the majority noted that there
are other areas where significant non-Indian populations live in or near
reservations without disastrous consequences.51
In a sweeping condemnation of the policy reasons put forth by
both Oklahoma and the dissent, the Court cautioned that “the magnitude

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
dissenting)).
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
Michigan).

Id. at 2476.
Id. at 2476.
Id. at 2477.
Id. at 2478.
Id. (citing Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 704-706 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
Id.
Id. at 2479.
Id.
Id.
Id. (describing Tacoma, Washington, and Mount Pleasant,
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of the legal wrong is no reason to perpetuate it.”52 The Court outlined why
the implications for both criminal and civil law were not relevant to the
question before the Court.53 However, the Court held that the drastic
changes Oklahoma warned of were overstated, especially since the Creek
Nation already had hundreds of intergovernmental agreements in place
with the State.54
IV. DISSENT
The dissent, written by Chief Justice Roberts and joined by
Justices Alito, Kavanaugh and Thomas, disagreed with the Court’s
dismissal of the extratextual evidence, and used the three-part test
suggested by Oklahoma to determine historic practice and demographics
evinced disestablishment of the Creek Reservation.55 The dissent first
looked to Congress’s intention in various statutes passed by Congress, the
contemporaneous understanding of the legislation and historical context,
and the subsequent understanding of the reservation and pattern of
settlement.56 In light of all the relevant evidence, the dissent concluded
that Congress intended to disestablish the Reservation.57 The dissent
finished its opinion by reciting concerns that non-Indians living on
reservation land would be burdened by the change in governance.58
Justice Thomas joined the dissent and also wrote separately to
opine the Court lacked jurisdiction to review the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeal’s decision.59
IV. CONCLUSION
McGirt is a landmark Supreme Court case because of the
ramifications for the Creek Nation, Oklahoma, and federal Indian law.
While Oklahoma argued the consequences of holding for the Tribe would
upend Oklahoma law, the Court declined to base its decision on anything
but straightforward statutory interpretation. As a result, much of Tulsa is
now recognized as Indian Country.

52.
Id. at 2480.
53.
Id.
54.
Id. at 2481.
55.
Id. at 2482.
56.
Id. (discussing the Act of June 27, 1898 [“The Curtis Act”], §28 and
Act of Apr. 26, 1906, ch. 1876, 34 Stat. 137 [“The Five Tribes Act], among others.)
57.
Id. at 2489.
58.
Id. at 2499–2502.
59.
Id. at 2502–04.

